































    






This paper examines the impact of the introduction of casemix funding (together with 
budget cuts) to public hospitals in Victoria over the period 1992/93 to 1995/96.  One 
of the aims of introducing casemix funding at the time was to increase efficiency, 
which is defined as reducing the amount of inputs required for a given output 
produced.  However, the evidence shows that since this period in Victoria the rate of 
growth of overall health expenditures has increased, suggesting inefficiencies.  During 
the implementation phase of casemix funding, there were many hospitals that either 
amalgamated or closed.  This paper shows that this activity occurred in rural Victoria.  
It will be shown that, although the new funding policy alters the way in which scarce 
resources (government funding) are distributed to acute hospitals, it is not evident that 
this alteration has resulted in improved efficiency.  Evidence also indicates that 
standards of care, as measured by the number of patients on the non-emergency 
waiting list, have since fallen. 
 




Since 1 July 1993 public hospitals in Victoria have been compared for efficiency in 
the delivery of their services.  Casemix funding arrangements were implemented, 
among other reasons, to improve efficiency in the delivery of hospital services.  
Duckett (1999), p 107 states that under casemix funding ‘The hospital therefore 
becomes more clearly accountable for variation in the efficiency of the services it 
provides’.  Also, ‘Generally, case-mix funding is seen as being able to yield efficiency 
improvements more rapidly than negotiated funding…’.  Hospital casemix 
comparisons provide State bodies with information on how to allocate funding among 
hospitals by means of annual capped budgets.  Budgets are capped because funding is 
restricted to a given number of patients that can be treated in any given year.  Thus, 
casemix funding relies heavily on cost comparisons between hospitals; with hospital 
output measured using diagnosis related groups (DRGs). 
 DRGs identify groups of diagnoses that require a similar level of resources to 
treat a patient.  This makes it possible for the cost of treating a particular diagnosis to 
be compared across hospitals.  Historically this comparison was not possible since 
hospitals could claim that their casemix contained diagnoses that required more 
intensive use of resources, justifying higher costs and increased budgets.  The DRG 
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weights take these differences into account, since diagnoses that have a higher 
resource utilisation are attributed a higher DRG weighting.  DRGs are used, therefore, 
to standardise for differences in the casemix of hospitals and allow comparisons of 
hospital costs. 
 The aim of this paper is to analyse hospital statistics and the institutional 
framework in Victoria to show what effect the new funding regime has had, and 
whether policymakers’ original objectives in implementing casemix funding were in 
fact realised.   
 
2. Background 
There are several reasons why health reforms were undertaken in Victoria at this time.  
As far back as the mid 1980s Victoria’s hospital system was being scrutinised in 
efficiency terms, with a view to introducing global funding.  In early 1982 the 
Victorian Health Department had already gathered comparative data on cost per 
patient treated, adjusted for casemix using DRGs.  Various reports published in the 
late 1980s concluded that hospital services in Victoria were inefficient.  As a 
consequence, a Commission of Audit was appointed shortly following the 1992 State 
election.  The Commission of Audit was charged with the task of reporting on State 
finances generally and, among its findings, concluded that Victorian acute hospitals 
were 18 per cent more expensive than hospitals in other States (Lin and Duckett, 
1997).  Findings from data published by the Commonwealth Grants Commission 
corroborated this finding by noting that Victorian hospitals were relatively inefficient. 
 A further reason why reforms were undertaken in Victoria was that, at the 
time, hospitals were funded annually on an historical cost basis.  This was a perverse 
system that provided hospitals with increased budgets each year regardless of activity 
or productivity levels.  Under this system there was an in-built incentive for hospitals 
to spend their full allocation of funds in order to secure a subsequent funding increase.  
This funding arrangement needed to be addressed, since it was held partly responsible 
for Victoria’s $30 billion debt (Victorian Budget Papers, 1999/2000). 
  Government debt characterised the period 1992-93 to 1994-95.  The newly 
elected Liberal coalition was committed to its reduction and so undertook expenditure 
cuts across many sectors.  According to Duckett (1994), in its first year, 30 per cent of 
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the total State budget reduction1 was achieved solely by funding cuts to Acute Health.  
This was a considerably disproportionate reduction, given that Acute Health absorbs 
approximately 17 per cent of the State budget.  Budget cuts were thus implemented 
alongside the new funding regime, making it difficult to distinguish between the two 
effects and, subsequently, casemix funding received a considerable amount of 
negative press. 
 Scotton and Owens (1990) provide a clarification of the issues and sentiment 
behind the rationale for introducing casemix funding using DRGs in the first instance. 
The central idea behind the use of case payment for hospital 
reimbursement is that payment geared to output will result in more 
efficient performance than other formulae.  The key concepts 
involved are the treated case as the payment unit and a casemix 
model which enables cases with different treatment requirements to 
be categorised and costed. 
 (Scotton and Owens, 1990, p 1)2
 
3. Literature 
This paper draws on relevant work that describes the funding arrangements in place 
during this period.  Donato and Scotton (1999), Duckett (1994), (1995) and (1999), 
Fetter (1991), Hall (1999), Lin and Duckett (1997), Magarry (1999) and Scotton and 
Owens (1990) provide evidence on the Australian and/or Victorian health care 
systems.  Antioch et al. (1999), Southon (1994), Braithwaite and Hindle (1998), 
Phelan (1998), Walsh (1996), and Hanson (1998) all contribute to the debate over 
whether or not DRGs and casemix funding will benefit the Australian health market. 
 The Australian healthcare system is complex in the way it is funded and 
structured.  Donato and Scotton (1999) provide an overview of health care 
arrangements in Australia, and the problems and issues in the system.  The authors 
provide detail on the mixed private/public nature of funding and health provision.  
They also provide expenditure comparisons with OECD countries for the years 1975 
to 1995 (Donato and Scotton, 1999, Table 2.2).  These figures show that Australia’s 
health expenditure trend (on average between 8 and 8.5 percent of GDP over this 
period) is consistent with most other OECD countries. 
 Donato and Scotton distinguish between expenditure on medical services (via 
Medicare) and expenditure on health care.  They note that ‘[b]etween 1988/89 and 
                                                 
1 By 1999/2000 State debt was reduced by over 80 per cent to $6.1 billion (Victorian Budget Papers, 
1999/2000, p 5) 
2 Words in bold are as per original cited. 
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1994/95 expenditure on medical services grew at an average real rate of 5.4 per cent 
per annum, compared with 3.5 per cent for health care expenditure as a whole’ 
(Donato and Scotton, 1999, p 28).  The authors note that the reason this occurred 
relates to the fact that medical services provided by private practitioners are 
uncapped. 
 Donato and Scotton (1999) acknowledge that many problems associated with 
Australia’s health system are common among OECD countries.  However, they also 
identify some problems that are unique to Australia.  These problems, according to 
the authors, exist due to the peculiar nature of the institutional and structural 
characteristics of the Australian health system.  Firstly, is the problem of vertical 
fiscal imbalance, which is exacerbated by the dual funding of healthcare services by 
both the Commonwealth and the States.  Secondly, is the issue of declining private 
health insurance cover.  The authors note that in 1983, the year prior to the 
introduction of Medicare, 63.7 per cent of the population was privately insured.  One 
year later, following the introduction of Medicare, this figure fell to 50 per cent 
(Donato and Scotton, 1999)3.  The authors posit that structural instability in financing 
originates from the fact that private cover is voluntary, and the universal system, 
funded through compulsory taxation, is available to all. 
 For an historical description of the evolution of casemix funding in Victoria 
see Duckett (1994) and Duckett (1995).  The author presents descriptive evidence on 
the reasons why casemix funding was designed (to improve overall efficiency and to 
reduce waiting lists) as well as providing a useful history of the development of DRGs 
in the US and Australia.  Duckett (1995) discusses the effect of combining budget 
cuts with the introduction of casemix funding in Victoria.  Budget cuts to healthcare 
were brought in over a three-year period (July 1992 to June 1995) in support of the 
Government’s aggressive industrial stance.  New industrial relations laws, together 
with once-off funds, provided hospitals with the ability to make forced redundancies 
and offer early retirement, thereby reducing staffing costs.  This combination resulted 
in a restructuring in hospitals ‘...changing the fixed/variable ratio – rather than simply 
cost reduction’ (Duckett, 1995, p 118). 
                                                 




 The possibility of teaching hospitals being unfairly disadvantaged by the new 
funding regime was identified.  These hospitals undertake training and development 
activities, the additional costs for which would appear as greater inefficiency when 
compared with non-teaching hospitals.  This problem was addressed by dividing 
hospital activities into four categories of outputs, namely inpatient services, outpatient 
services, training and development, and other specified programs (Duckett, 1995).  
This separation into sub-programs meant that each sub-program could be funded 
differently. 
 Separate funding arrangements were developed for each of these sub-
programs with the inpatient sub-program being funded on a casemix 
basis and the other sub-programs being funded on a mixture of 
casemix, historic and output bases. 
 (Duckett, 1995, p 119). 
 
 Duckett (1995) details the process by which resource weights for inpatient 
services were developed in Victoria, namely by utilising patient level costing systems.  
The basic unit for payment became the weighted inlier equivalent separation (WIES).  
This is a measure that firstly deals with exceptional cases or outliers, which are 
‘...folded into the inlier payment to create an inlier equivalent separation...’ (Duckett, 
1995).   
 An additional throughput pool was implemented to provide an incentive for 
hospitals to increase throughput and reduce waiting lists.  This new tool potentially 
provided increased payments to hospitals.  Total payments from the pool were 
capped, however, such that the amount available in the pool was fixed, and the price 
per additional patient treated was allowed to fluctuate.  This was necessary because 
Government set the total amount available in the pool, and the increased throughput 
was determined by hospital activity on a quarterly basis.  Thus, changing the price for 
additional patients treated ensured that the pool did not expire (Duckett, 1995). 
 The issue of quality maintenance in hospitals was also of concern to those 
responsible for implementing casemix funding in Victoria.  Many considered that the 
move to casemix funding in pursuit of improved efficiency would endanger health 
outcomes.  This concern led to the requirement that all hospitals produce a quality 
assurance plan annually (Duckett, 1995).  Hospitals were also encouraged to 
participate in the Australian Council of Healthcare Standards accreditation process.  
Accreditation by hospitals to this organisation was rewarded with an annual specified 
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grant.  Data also began to be collected from hospitals on unplanned re-admission rates 
as this was considered to be ‘...the best indicator of potential quality problems’ 
(Duckett, 1995, p 127).  Furthermore, consumer experience of hospitals was measured 
with a consumer satisfaction survey that provided data on patients’ perception of care 
received (Duckett, 1995). 
 Duckett (1995) concludes by elaborating on the perverse incentives which are 
inherent in casemix funding, and which may work to counter ethical practice.  These 
are identified as increased unnecessary admissions, hospitals providing only activities 
for which they are paid, the neglect of altruism in health provision, and 
ethical/medical risks of medical practitioners’ early discharge decisions. 
 Duckett (1999) deals with hospitals in Australia; their capacity and utilisation, 
funding arrangements, and how hospital services are categorised.  The author 
provides an overall picture of the Australian healthcare landscape, including statistics 
showing State and Territory comparisons for 1995/96 of the number of hospitals, 
beds, beds per 1000 population and beds per hospital for both the public and private 
sectors (Duckett, 1999, p 94, Table 5.1).  Further data are provided on the provision 
and use of acute hospitals in Australia between 1985/86 and 1993/94.  These data 
show a declining trend in the number of public acute hospital beds per 1000 
population (22 per cent) and private acute beds (7.7 per cent) over the period.  
Separate data are provided for metropolitan and non-metropolitan regions.  In rural 
areas the decline in public acute hospital beds has been more marked at almost 30 per 
cent.  The author attributes this decline to ‘...specific government policies to reduce 
bed provision...’ (Duckett, 1999, p 96).  Conversely, the rural trend for private acute 
beds per 1000 population shows an increase of over 42 per cent over the period.  The 
author attributes this trend partly to a reduction in population in those areas, and 
partly to new private hospitals being constructed in rural areas (Duckett, 1999). 
 Duckett (1999) also identifies productivity changes with the use of data on 
admissions, average length of stay (LOS) and occupancy data.  For both public and 
private sectors over the period there is an increase of admissions per 1000 population 
of 21.6 percent and 27 per cent respectively.  These data, coupled with reduced LOS 
(by 30 and 25 percent) and increased occupancy rates (by 11 and 8 percent), show 
significant productivity improvements overall.  The author notes that LOS reduction 
is due to the increase in day-only patients and reduction in stays of long duration.  He 
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attributes this trend to the effect of improvements in medical technology over the 
period (Duckett, 1999). 
 Duckett (1999) notes that casemix funding places incentives on hospitals to 
provide appropriate care in an efficient manner.  This is because casemix funding is 
paid to hospitals per patient treated and as a reimbursement.  Although the author 
acknowledges that hospitals cannot determine how many people present themselves 
for treatment, they do have control over the length of stay, the number of tests 
ordered, and other costs associated with hospital stays.  The incentive for hospitals to 
be more efficient with their allocated funds lies in the way that the ‘...funder or 
purchaser assumes the risk for cost variations caused by variations in the number and 
type of patient treated, by setting differential prices for different types of patients and 
allowing budgets to vary with volume’ (Duckett, 1999, p 107).  The prices noted here 
are determined by grouping diagnoses by their characteristics. 
 The literature on hospitals and government expenditure shows that there is 
some relationship between the type of government funding and overall expenditure.  
Antioch et al. (1999) compare Victoria and New South Wales using the benchmark 
funding rates for WIES.  They use data on per capita health spending in different 
States, and per capita hospital spending, after adjusting for dispersion and scale.  
From this analysis, Antioch et al. (1999) show the change in per capita public hospital 
costs in Victoria from 1991-92 to 1995-96. 
 These comparisons showed that Victoria’s per capita public hospital 
costs, which were some $65 above New South Wales in 1991-92, 
were about $20 lower in 1995-96. 
 (Antioch et al., 1999, p 135). 
 
 Antioch et al. (1999) produce multiple regressions that identify independent 
variables impacting on Victoria’s per capita expenditure (adjusted by the CPI) on 
recognised public hospitals.  These variables include Victorian Gross State Product 
per capita, the unemployment rate in Victoria, the proportion of public beds to total 
public and private beds in Victoria, a dummy variable for the introduction of casemix 
funding and funding cuts, and the ratio of non-same-day separations to same-day 
separations in Victorian public hospitals.  The authors take results from the OECD’s 
1993 cross-country econometric work that explores factors affecting health spending, 
and use them to estimate their model.  The OECD results indicate that countries that 
pay physicians by capitation, countries where patients pay the provider and then seek 
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reimbursement and countries with more doctors per capita all have lower overall 
expenditure.  Among the key findings for their research Antioch et al. (1999) note 
that, as expected, funding cuts and the introduction of casemix funding led to falls in 
expenditure on recognised public hospitals.  They stress, however, that the 
introduction of casemix funding did not cause funding cuts. 
 Clearly, casemix funding did not cause funding cuts; it was 
introduced at the same time as the funding cuts.  Casemix funding 
simply provided the incentives to change the method allocating the 
funds that were available. 
 (Antioch et al., 1999, p 148). 
 
 Phelan (1998) provides an explanation as to why DRG-based funding was 
necessarily implemented in Victoria.  He notes the overall cost savings generated 
since its implementation and provides both the benefits and possible problems 
associated with DRG-based funding.  The author acknowledges that budget cuts were 
necessary in Victoria, and that DRGs assisted the process by making budget cuts more 
equitable across hospitals.  The author also notes that DRG-based funding improved 
work practices, and altered the management mix in hospitals. 
 Many hospitals realised that, if they were to manage the changes 
successfully, they had to involve clinicians in senior management, as 
their decisions are responsible for about 80% of healthcare costs. 
 (Phelan, 1998, p 560). 
 
 Phelan (1998) notes other successes in Victoria stemming from the 
introduction of DRG-based funding.  Among these were less (expensive) 
investigations, better managed length of stay, and the deliberate move to day-only 
surgery.  Also, discharges were no longer delayed pending the twice-weekly 
consultant ward round (Phelan, 1998). 
 Hanson (1998) provides evidence on the limitations to using Australian 
National DRGs (AN-DRGs).  These limitations include inadequate measures of 
severity of illness being incorporated into DRGs, and the poor quality of patient data 
available to form the groups.  The author also suggests that DRG-based funding was 
developed too quickly and resulted in perverse incentives as healthcare providers 
struggle for survival. 
 A DRG-based payment system is meant to be about allocative 
efficiency, and not about increased throughput and profiteering.  In 
an underfunded healthcare environment it should have come as no 
surprise that perverse incentives would be difficult to control, and 
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that the focus would not be on quality and outcomes, but rather on 
the survival of healthcare services. 
 (Hanson, 1998, p 561). 
 
 Another contrary view to using DRGs in the casemix funding process is 
provided by Braithwaite (1994) and Braithwaite and Hindle (1998).  The authors 
argue that DRGs take a simplistic view of variations in patients’ needs (including 
severity of illness and comorbidity).  They state that DRGs fail to respond with 
sufficient speed to developments in technology and science and are out of date by the 
time they are used.  They also argue that there are data problems involved in the 
clinical process such as coding errors, misdiagnoses and medical uncertainties.  The 
use of DRGs, however, suggests that classifying patients can be scientific and precise.  
Braithwaite and Hindle (1998), although generally in agreement with Hanson (1998), 
consider that DRG-based funding attempts to promote technical efficiency, rather 
than allocative efficiency. 
 DRG funding attempts to promote technical efficiency in only one 
part of the healthcare sector – the acute care of inpatients. 
 (Braithwaite and Hindle, 1998, p 558). 
 
 Braithwaite and Hindle (1998) also point to some ethical considerations in 
applying economics to healthcare.  The authors note that neoclassical economists 
espouse that productivity and efficiency are driven by incentives, whereas healthcare 
workers are motivated ‘from within’ to provide quality care to patients (Braithwaite 
and Hindle, 1998, p 559)4. 
 Walsh (1996) contends that casemix funding is a major advance over the 
historical budgeting procedure that existed in Victoria prior to July, 1993.  He also 
argues that under casemix funding there is a focus on efficiency and much greater 
accountability for the use of funds and hospital management performance.  Among 
the achievements under casemix funding, the author notes an increase in productivity 
in Victorian hospitals with ‘...15% more work with 10% less money since 1992-93’ 
                                                 
4 Whilst it is true that paid nursing staff and allied workers do exceptional work with regard to 
improving health outcomes of patients, the issue of efficiency deals with the way that resources are 
managed in the production process.  That is, DRG-based funding should be viewed as impacting on 
managerial decisions, rather than altering individual staff job descriptions or diminishing an 
individual’s desire to provide quality care.  Ethical arguments against DRG-based payments are 
emotionally charged and unhelpful in finding better ways to apply increasingly scarce resources to the 
growing market for healthcare. 
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(Walsh, 1996, p 133)5.  The list of achievements includes a 30% increase in day-only 
cases (spanning over 2 years), increased throughput, declining waiting lists, and 
improved emergency access.  Among the disadvantages of casemix funding, the 
author notes that ‘[t]here is still too much emphasis on inpatients and too much 
emphasis on throughput’ (Walsh, 1996, p 133).  The issue of ‘averaging’ is also 
considered a disadvantage since hospitals that specialise have only a limited number 
of patient categories and many of these may require intensive care treatment, which is 
costly and requires longer stays. 
 Southon (1994) offers a perspective on Victoria’s health reforms in light of 
long-term effects.  He argues that hospitals do not operate like traditional markets 
since a third party is involved in payment for patient services.  The author also 
outlines the existence of perverse incentives in health markets6.  Southon (1994) notes 
that the move to a ‘managed market’ for healthcare in Victoria may in fact result in 
significantly increased administrative costs.  That is, costs may rise due to increased 
workloads associated with maintaining the fee schedule, responding to hospital 
appeals for special treatment, and ongoing alteration of hospital strategies to ensure 
that they remain competitive (Southon, 1994).  Furthermore, the author identifies 
institutional effects of hospitals that, together with change in management style 
required under reforms, could impact detrimentally on hospital performance in the 
longer term (Southon, 1994).  In conclusion, the author states that the Victorian 
experiment is a brave initiative that has been met with some early successes.  He also 
states that inherent management costs in health reforms could detract from service 
provision, degrading long-term clinical capabilities.  These are valid points and 
should be considered in more depth when examining the effect of casemix funding. 
 Lin and Duckett (1997) provide a summary of the health reform process in 
Victoria.  The authors express concerns over the effect of DRGs on quality outcomes 
where hospital activity could be misinterpreted as efficiency without regard to 
outcomes.  Further descriptions of the Victorian health reform agenda can be found in 
Fox (1996), and Tonti-Fillippini (1996). 
 Clearly, the issue of whether the intention is to improve allocative efficiency 
or technical efficiency is important in whether or not the funding method is accepted 
                                                 
5 It is not clear how these percentages are calculated. 
6 For a discussion of market failure and asymmetric information in health markets, see Evans (1984)  
and Donato and Scotton (1999). 
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by clinicians and commentators.  Those authors who are in favour of the use of 
casemix funding based on DRGs7 present arguments based on improvements in 
productivity.  Productivity is defined as increased output for a given input, and forms 
part of technical efficiency.  Those authors who present arguments against the use of 
a DRG-based payment system do so arguing reduced quality and reduced services 
provided by hospitals.  These are issues of allocative efficiency because they deal 
with the combination of products/services being produced; changing the way that 
resources are allocated in the production process in order to produce the greatest 
gains.  The new funding arrangements alter the incentives to produce and, therefore, 
may impact negatively on allocative efficiency.  The disentangling of the above 
arguments for and against DRG-based funding results in a quandary.  It is possible, 
after all, for both arguments to coexist.  Hence, assuming that both camps have a 
justifiable position, the question appears to be whether the negative effects (by not 
producing what society wants) on allocative efficiency grounds, counteract the 
positive impact (improved productivity) that casemix funding has achieved on 
technical efficiency grounds.  This tradeoff is evidenced by the subsequent result that 
in order to improve technical efficiency overall, there has been a reduction in hospital 
services in more remote locations. 
 This literature highlights the key issues that are significant in the development 
of this paper.  Whether hospitals manage their inputs (resources) efficiently relies to a 
great extent on policymakers putting in place the correct incentives to bring about 
desired behaviour.  Policymakers have many issues to consider when determining the 
structure of incentives, since the operations of public hospitals are complex and 
exhibit relationships and processes that do not exist in the competitive market.  The 
cost-increasing effect of new technology, for example, is an area requiring particular 
attention.  It is widely recognised that innovations stemming from research and 
development are a desirable outcome in the pursuit of improving living standards 
generally.  In medicine, technological advances improve medical capabilities, thereby 
reducing patient recovery time, and/or improving procedural success rates.  These 
benefits accrue directly to patients and also indirectly to the wider community when 
consideration is made of reducing the amount of work time lost to hospitalisation 
                                                 
7 See for example Walsh (1996), Phelan (1998) and Duckett (1999). 
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and/or illness.  The increased costs, however, accrue to the healthcare sector and are 
subject to the funding arrangements in place. 
 One point that arises in the literature is predicated upon whether DRG weights 
used in casemix funding should be related to the performance of procedures 
(retrospective), or whether they should be related to actual diagnoses (prospective).  
Payments based on retrospective DRGs are associated with increased reimbursement 
since these DRGs are treatment-related and, depending on severity of illness, carry 
relatively higher weights.  More intensive treatment is further enabled by the 
existence and use of new technology which, in turn, provides patients with surgical 
options that increase treatment costs.  DRGs that capture actual diagnoses, and that 
are prospective, are a better tool for ensuring that resources will be used efficiently in 
treatment.  Uncertainty arises, however, due to the fact that initial clinical diagnoses 
are not always correct and, concomitantly, retrospective DRGs better reflect the 
imprecise nature of clinical practice decisions. 
 For all the objections raised to casemix funding being implemented, it is 
apparent that on balance the Victorian experience has successfully aided our ability to 
at least influence the allocation of scarce resources, even if not to improve overall 
efficiency.  This paper will show that it was, in fact, hospital merger activity 
following Victoria’s move to casemix funding that secured the gains that Victorian 
policymakers were seeking, and not improved efficiencies within individual hospitals. 
 
4. Acute Health Division 
For the purpose of this study, the division within Human Services that is of particular 
interest is the Acute Health Division.  This division accounts for approximately 50 per 
cent of the Department of Human Services’ budget and, therefore, approximately 17 
per cent of the State Government’s overall financial commitment.  Acute Health is 
responsible for funding the delivery of acute and sub-acute services, the provision of 
ambulance services, and ensuring the provision of adequate and safe supplies of blood 
and blood products (DHS, 99/00, p10).  Within these parameters Acute Health 
delivers strategies to promote efficiency and accountability in public hospitals, and 
ensures the continued development of the casemix funding system.  It is also charged 
with improving ambulance responsiveness, inpatient and rehabilitation services, 
maternity care and the general delivery of healthcare in Victoria. 
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 Prior to the introduction of casemix funding, historical cost funding was based 
on inputs such as salaries and pharmaceuticals.  Any budget reductions made during 
this period usually resulted in reduced services.  This was followed by the period in 
the mid-1980s when detailed input controls over hospitals began to be relaxed and 
hospitals moved to ‘global budgeting’.  Under this system hospitals were able to shift 
funds between the various classes of inputs, and between salary and non-salary 
expenditure.  Although this change was accompanied by an increasing emphasis on 
measuring a hospital’s total activity levels, the link between inputs and outputs 
remained weak.  This funding system (and varying political strengths within the 
hospital) rewarded advocacy skills rather than promoting efficiency of input use (Lin 
and Duckett, 1997, p 48). 
 
5. Health Reforms 
In the period 1992-93 to 1994-95, Victorian State debt exceeded $30 Billion 
(Victorian Budget Papers, 1999/2000, p 5).  The newly elected Liberal coalition was 
committed to reducing this debt and so undertook expenditure cuts.  At the same time 
there was evidence that Victorian hospitals were less efficient than hospitals in the 
other Australian states.  Shortly after the 1992 state election the Liberal coalition 
government appointed a Commission of Audit whose purpose was to assess and 
report on state finances.  The Report presented to the Premier in 1993 ‘claimed that 
Victorian acute hospitals were 18 per cent more expensive than hospitals in other 
states’ (Lin and Duckett, 1997, p 49).  The Report further claims that ‘with the 
introduction of output-based funding using casemix data, annual efficiency gains 
could be as much as 14 per cent ($373m) of the current hospitals (sic) budget if a new 
hospital funding base is set based on comparable NSW benchmarks’ (Victorian 
Commission of Audit, 1993, p 81).  The Report also found that a significant 
determinant of cost inefficiencies in Victorian hospitals, relative to those in New 
South Wales, was excessive staffing levels.  The Government also had evidence from 
the Commonwealth Grants Commission to the effect that Victorian hospitals were 
relatively inefficient.  In view of these findings and in view of the necessary 
expenditure cuts, it was considered that an across-the-board funding reduction would 
not be equitable to those hospitals operating efficiently.  The funding cuts were thus 
targeted at hospitals found to be operating inefficiently. 
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 A further reason put forward for reform of the health sector was the existence 
of growing hospital waiting lists.  Of the 30,000 people on waiting lists in Victoria, 5 
per cent were in need of Category 1 urgent care.  Since the Government had made 
pre-election promises to reduce these waiting lists, it had to also ensure that funding 
cuts would not have the opposite effect.  Thus, the objectives of reform were: 
• To introduce a fair basis for funding hospitals in the context of an 
overall budget reduction; 
• To improve the efficiency of public hospitals, and; 
• To provide for an expansion in the number of patients treated and thus 
to allow a reduction in waiting lists. 
(Duckett, 1994, p 20) 
 
 According to Duckett (1994) it was the Government’s intention to introduce 
casemix funding as the means of restructuring hospital funding arrangements so that 
the right financial incentives could be put in place to achieve these objectives.  It 
could be argued, however, that casemix funding was the means of achieving 
considerable reductions in government expenditure at a time when the newly elected 
government was at the height of its popularity.  Health reforms were also necessary 
due to the Federal Government’s broader concerns for microeconomic reform.  That 
is, the provision of health care was not immune to the legislative amendments to anti-
trust legislation that focused on increased competition and efficiency in Australia 
generally. 
 With respect to complying with the principles of the National Competition 
Policy, the DHS proposed that increased competition between private and public 
hospitals could be addressed by developing a more equitable funding system.  The 
various funding systems put forward for comment at the time were all designed so 
that both types of hospital could compete for private patients on an equal footing, 
eliminating the ‘unfair advantage’ exercised by public hospitals (DHS, 1996). 
 The first version of DRGs adopted by the Victorian Government in 1993 was 
Australian National Diagnosis Related Groups (AN-DRGs).  Using this particular 
measure the Minister for Health was able to implement casemix funding so that 
hospital services followed patients, rather than hospitals receiving funding as 
institutions in control of their own budgets.  As casemix funding was espoused by the 
Minister, it was a matter of putting the patients’ needs ahead of all else (Stoelwinder 
and Viney, 2000, p214). 
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 The newly elected government needed to overcome the problem of budget 
cuts resulting in longer waiting lists.  It was decided that the best way to overcome 
this problem was to provide an incentive to hospitals to increase throughput.  Extra 
revenue from an additional throughput pool could be gained by hospitals that were 
able to meet their waiting list performance criteria.  However, this incentive proved to 
be too effective by the second year of operation, when the increase in throughput was 
double the amount previously anticipated by the Department.  This extra throughput 
resulted in additional pressure on funds in the pool, and meant that there was 
difficulty keeping within the pool’s budget.  In response to this situation the 
Government decided to limit any hospital’s call on the pool to 5 per cent of its base 
throughput target.  The result of this decision, however, was to reduce patient 
throughput as a consequence of budget cuts; something that the additional throughput 
pool was designed to overcome (Stoelwinder and Viney, 2000, p215). 
 Reductions in throughput led eventually to bed closures, staff sackings and the 
sudden increase of people on hospital waiting lists.  Casemix funding received 
significant negative media attention that held the Government responsible for its 
implementation.  That is, although budget cuts were responsible for bed closures, it 
was the fact that budget cuts were undertaken within the new casemix funding regime 
that drew criticism from the media and political opponents.  Commentators took the 
view that casemix funding led to budget cuts and, therefore, casemix funding was 
responsible for bed closures and increased waiting lists.  The additional throughput 
pool was subsequently abolished in 1995/96 (Duckett, 2000). 
 As the purchasing arrangements currently operate in Victoria, hospitals 
receive a capped annual budget from which to provide inpatient services.  That is, 
hospitals know in advance the total number of WIES annually that will be funded.  It 
is therefore necessary that hospitals plan ahead to ensure that funding will be 
available for the full year.  There is ‘…no capacity for additional funding in the event 
of budget overrun’ (Brook, 2006, p4).  According to the Victorian Department of 
Human Services, budget caps dictate planning measures by hospitals which ensure 
efficiency in resource utilisation. 
…the system utilises capital and recurrent resource restrictions to 
ensure that duplication, particularly of highly expensive high 
technology care, is minimised…[and]…It [casemix funding] 
emphasises technical (cost) efficiency and…has been instrumental 
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in transforming Victoria’s hospital system from arguably 
Australia’s least efficient, to a highest level of efficiency. 
(Brook, 2006, p4) 
 
 In tandem with budget caps, the author states that there are in place price 
signals, through bonus and penalty arrangements, ‘…which encourage desired policy 
outcomes – such as meeting emergency and elective surgical waiting time targets’ 
(Brook, 2006, p4).  Thus, on the one hand budgets are capped to fund a given number 
of WIES annually and, on the other hand, hospitals are required to maintain waiting 
list targets which, if they are successful, may lead to budget overruns.  Under these 
circumstances it is probable that hospitals will allow waiting lists for non-emergency 
elective surgery to grow rather than risk receiving insufficient funding for a given 
year. 
 Patients are categorised into clinical categories when they are placed on the 
waiting list.  The three categories were established to identify the relative clinical 
priority of patients needing hospital admission.  The categories range from Category 
One (condition can potentially deteriorate quickly – admit within 30 days), Category 
Two (condition causing some pain, dysfunction or disability but is not likely to 
deteriorate quickly – admit within 90 days), and Category Three (minimal or no pain, 
dysfunction or disability, not likely to deteriorate quickly and non-emergency – admit 
some time in the future). 
 The Review of Elective Surgery Waiting Lists was set up in 1998 to determine 
whether there was any evidence to support allegations made by the Australian 
Medical Association (AMA) of widespread manipulation of hospital waiting lists 
throughout Victoria (Clarke and Bennett, 1998).  The Review’s findings, that this was 
not the case, were presented to the Victorian Minister for Health in September 1998.  
The findings show that ‘There has been a steady increase in both the total number of 
patients treated in Victoria’s public hospitals and in elective surgery patients since 
1991’ (Clarke and Bennett, 1998, p24).  This is represented by two charts which show 







Chart 1 – Victorian Waiting List and Total Hospital Throughput 
 Jan. 91 – Oct. 97 
 
 Source:  Clarke and Bennett, 1998, p24 
 
 According to Chart 1 throughput fluctuates widely over a rising trend over the 
period to meet the increased demand for hospital services.  It is also apparent from 
Chart 1 that there was an initial reduction in the waiting list over 1993-1994, but then 
the waiting list rose again to slightly more than pre-existing levels in 1995 onwards.  
Chart 2 shows the separation of Category One and Category Two patients on the 
waiting list. 
 It is clear from Chart 2 that the number of Category One and Category Two 
patients on the waiting list fell following the implementation of casemix funding in 
July 1993.  Taking Charts 1 and 2 together it is apparent that, because the total 
waiting list rose to above pre-existing levels, it must be the case that Category Three 
patients on the waiting list rose over the period.  These are not reported separately in 
the Review’s findings.  Also the two charts show different scale on the vertical axis.  
Chart 2 appears to show relatively large fluctuations, however for Category Two data 
the change from peak in 1993 to trough in 1997 is less than 5,000 patients.  These 
data confirm that the number of Category Three patients on the waiting list did in fact 
rise over the period.  The incentives in place to reduce Category One and Two 
patients on the waiting list appear to be working, however at the expense of Category 
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Three patients.  The result, therefore, is that there was a redistribution of patients 
between categories, with a zero net effect. 
 
Chart 2 –  Victorian Patients Waiting for Elective Surgery 
 Jul. 91 – Oct. 97 
 
 
 Source:  Clarke and Bennett, 1998, p24 
 
 In the first two years of operation, casemix funding was comprised of a 
number of component grants.  Table 1 shows the change in component grants between 
the years 1993-94 and 1994-95.  The compensation component was only intended for 
the first year of operation of casemix funding, as a transitional grant from the old 
funding system to the new.  It was calculated on the difference between funding 
received by hospitals pre-casemix funding (1992-93) and that received post-casemix 
funding (1993-94) (McLean, 1994).  This component resulted in the removal of the 
effect of casemix funding in the first year of operation.  Clearly, without this 
compensating grant, funding would have decreased by approximately 8 per cent 








 Table 1: Victorian Casemix Funding Components 










patients 18 17 
Overhead 27.1 26 
Specified/training 
grants 13.4 16 
Compensation 8.1 0 
Variable Payments 33.4 41 
Total 100 100 
 Source:  McLean, 1994, p 34. 
 
 According to Table 1, with the exception of the overhead and non-admitted 
patient components, the remaining two components increased proportionally in the 
second year of casemix funding.  The largest increase occurred for variable payments.  
These include payments for public hospital medical officers, unit DRG 
reimbursements to hospitals, rural/isolated patient transfer costs and nursing home 
type patients.  With regard to Group E8 hospitals, located in rural Victoria, an 
additional $50 per patient treatment episode was paid by DHS ‘to reflect higher 
staffing costs in smaller institutions’ (McClean, 1994, p 34). 
 The specific period that this paper investigates is 1992/93 to 1995/96.  Over 
this period there was some change in expenditure trends.  Duckett (2000) shows, by 
constructing an index, how budgeted expenditure for acute health services in Victoria 
fell by 9 per cent initially between 1991/92 and 1993/94, and rose by 9 per cent above 
1991/92 levels in 1996/97 (Duckett, 2000, Table 8.1, p155).  The same table shows an 
index of separations which rises steadily from 100 to 131.  However, the author states 
that separations rose over the period by 75 per cent, as a response to the introduction 
of casemix funding.  He notes, nevertheless that some of the increase in activity may 
be due to the reclassification of some outpatients to inpatient status.  Duckett (2000) 
also notes that the WIES figure, which was introduced in 1993/94, rose at a much 
slower rate over the period.  The index for WIES rises from 100 to 109. 
The extent of actual versus nominal growth is difficult to estimate.  
Assuming that all the activity increase is real, the costs per 
                                                 
8 These are small hospitals with less than 500 separations per annum. 
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separation have declined by 25 per cent over the period 1991/92 to 
1996/97. 
(Duckett, 2000, p156). 
 
 Graph 1 is constructed using historical data9 from the Victorian Government’s 
Statement of Finances 2005-06, Budget Paper No. 4 (State of Victoria, 2005-06).  
Over the period 1992/93 to 1995/96 Graph 1 shows an initial significant slowing 
down of expenditure, followed by a period of reduced health expenditure in Victoria.  
Visually it is apparent that during the period prior to budget cuts and the 
implementation of casemix funding, expenditure increased steadily.  It is also 
apparent that from 1996/97 the rate of growth of expenditure surpasses earlier growth 
(that is, the gradient becomes steeper). 
 
Graph 1: Victorian General Government Operating Expenditure for (Total 
 Health Expenditure) 1961/62 to 2003/04 – historical series 

























































































 Source:  Victorian Budget Papers (2005-06) 
 
 Graph 1 shows the existence of budget cuts over the period 1992-1995; 
however it is not apparent to what extent acute health hospitals were affected because 
the graph plots the total figure for health expenditure in Victoria.  Nevertheless, these 
expenditure data show clearly the existence of budget cuts and health reforms that 
were directed at acute care. 
                                                 
9 One of the difficulties with obtaining a dependable data series for Victoria over this period has been 
the lack of uniform data collection by the relevant authorities.  The data that forms the content for 
Graph 1 is reproduced from Victorian Budget Papers.  Its original source is the Australian Bureau of 




6. Rural Victoria 
The implementation of casemix funding for acute health services in Victoria was 
anticipated to impact on small rural communities.  In 1993 the Victorian Small Rural 
Hospitals Task Force was established ‘to review the progress and difficulties of small 
rural hospitals in Victoria following the introduction of casemix funding’ (DHS, 
2002, p3).  There were 57 small rural hospitals each with 30 or fewer beds in 1994.  
These hospitals are classified as Group D and Group E hospitals and include Multi-
Purpose Service and Healthstreams agencies (DHS, 2002).  The Taskforce 
acknowledged the diverse nature of rural Victoria in terms of topography, geography 
and socio-economic factors.  It also acknowledged that small rural hospitals should 
provide services based on identified community needs.  The Taskforce noted that 
communities should be made aware of the benefits associated with the redistribution 
of resources away from ‘high cost underused bed-based services to more cost 
effective and accessible community based services’ (DHS, 2002, p 3).  As outlined in 
Table 1 variable payments to hospitals included a payment for rural/isolated patient 
transfer costs.  This payment was targeted specifically toward the cost of ambulance 
transfers between hospitals, which are more prevalent in remote rural communities.  
The amount in both years in Table 1 represents approximately 0.1 per cent of funding 
(McLean, 1994). 
 
7. Metropolitan Victoria 
It is interesting to note that hospitals located in the four Melbourne metropolitan 
regions serviced a population of 3,321,666 residents in 1997, whilst hospitals located 
in the balance of Victoria together serviced over 1.2 million residents (28 per cent of 
the resident population) (ABS Cat. 3234, 1997).  Table 2 shows a breakdown of the 
resident population located in Melbourne and the ten statistical divisions outside of 








 Table 2: Estimated Resident Population in Melbourne and 
 Non-metropolitan Victoria, 1997 
 
Statistical Division Estimated Resident Population 
Melbourne 3 321 666 
Non-Metropolitan Regions  
Barwon 240 906 
Western District 100 125 
Central Highlands 135 443 
Wimmera 52 027 
Mallee 87 590 
Loddon 158 656 
Goulburn 184 141 
Ovens-Murray 89 698 
East Gippsland 81 002 
Gippsland 153 894 
Total 4 605 148 
  Source: ABS Cat. No. 3234.2, 1997 
 
 These figures are best viewed along with hospital closures and amalgamations 
over the period. 
 
8. Hospital Movements 
Table 3 shows the number of hospitals operating in Victoria over the period 1992/93 
to 1995/96.  The hospitals are grouped by size in descending order. 
 
Table 3:  Number of Victorian Hospitals by size 1992/93 – 1995-96 
Group 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 
‘A’ Teaching Hospitals 16 16 16 16 
‘B’ Large Regional Base and 
Suburban Hospitals 22 22 21
a 21a
‘C’ Regional General Hospitals 24 24 23a 23a
‘D’ Area Hospitals 22 22 20a 20a
‘E’ Local Hospitals 33 31a 22b 21c
Total 117 115 102 101 
Source:  Victorian Hospitals’ Association, 1992/93 – 1995/96 




 With one exception all large teaching hospitals are located in the metropolitan 
area.  Groups C, D and E are located in non-metropolitan regions, and Group B 
hospitals are located in both areas. 
 It is clear from Table 3 that the total number of hospitals decreased over the 
period from 117 to 101.  The reduction in the number of hospitals shown is due to 
both hospital closures and amalgamations.  Local hospitals (Group ‘E’) experienced 
the greatest number of closures, namely 5 hospitals over the period, and also the 
greatest number of amalgamations of 7 hospitals.  Thus, in the final year this group 
contains 12 hospitals less than it contained in the first year. 
 Table 4 sets out totals for two outputs and two inputs by group over the period.  
The two outputs are WIES and inpatients treated, and the two inputs are equivalent 
full-time staff (non-medical) and average available beds.  Table 4 shows that total 
WIES declined in the second year of observation and then increased to 750,528.  The 
total number of inpatients treated, however, rose steadily over the period from 
690,461 to 871,725.  This was at the same time that EFT staff fell dramatically in the 
second year from 37,962 to 33,725 and then rose again to 36,095.  The figures for 
total average available beds are similar in that they fell dramatically in the second 


















Table 4:  Summary of Victorian Hospital Data 1992/93 – 1995/96 
Group Characteristic 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 % Change 
WIES 460226 456012 504845 502109 +9 
Inpatients Treated 430655 461581 522099 557691 +29.5 
EFT Staff (non-medical) 23594 21367 21975 23306 -1.2 
A 
Average Available Beds 6207 6289 6400 6652 +7.2 
WIES 173568 169473 178045 184989 +6.6 
Inpatients Treated 183860 195231 208134 227297 +23.6 
EFT Staff (non-medical) 9672 8190 7997 8848 -8.5 
B 
Average Available Beds 3084 2892 2732 2860 -7.2 
WIES 45019 40751 42401 42167 -6.3 
Inpatients Treated 49361 51294 54234 59664 +21 
EFT Staff (non-medical) 2526 2266 2282 2311 -8.5 
C 
Average Available Beds 974 879 907 883 -9.3 
WIES 23396 15594 15097 14983 -36 
Inpatients Treated 17457 18940 18259 19603 +12.3 
EFT Staff (non-medical) 1081 963 896 917 -15.2 
D 
Average Available Beds 481 428 428 416 -13.5 
WIES 14333 8768 7528 6280 -56 
Inpatients Treated 9128 9123 8242 7470 -18.2 
EFT Staff (non-medical) 1089 939 736 713 -34.5 
E 
Average Available Beds 348 361 272 215 -38.2 
WIES 716542 690553 747916 750528 +4.7 
Inpatients Treated 690461 736169 810968 871725 +26.2 
EFT Staff (non-medical) 37962 33725 33886 36095 -5 
Total 
Average Available Beds 11094 10849 10739 11026 -0.6 
Source:  Victorian Hospitals’ Association, 1992/93 – 1995/96 
 Table 4 also shows the differences in characteristics experienced by each of 
the groups.  It is apparent that EFT staff numbers have fallen in each of the groups, 
with the largest reduction being experienced by Group E hospitals (-34.5%).  This 
figure represents 376 EFT staff or 20% of the total EFT reduction.  Group A 
hospitals’ reduction of 1.2% represents 288 EFT staff or 15.4% of the total.  The 
largest relative reduction was experienced by Group B hospitals with 8.5% or 44.1% 
of the total reduction.  This group consists of large regional base and suburban 
hospitals (Table 3), and experienced one closure during the period.  It is therefore to 
be expected that this group would have the largest reduction as a proportion of the 
total.  The closures in Group E hospitals impact more on the communities they serve 
than they do on EFT staff, although a reduction in EFT would have the effect of 
reducing and/or re-assigning workers in those communities. 
 The figures for average available beds show a reduction in their number for all 
groups, with the exception of Group A hospitals.  Although there was no change in 
the number of hospitals in this group, beds increased by 445 or 7.2%.  It is possible 
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that more beds were made available in these hospitals to meet demand not met by 
other hospitals.  Indeed, the net effect is a small reduction of 0.6% or 68 beds overall.  
Once again the largest reduction was achieved by Group E hospitals with a 38% fall 
representing 133 beds.  Group B hospitals experienced the largest relative reduction 
of 224 beds, or 7.2% of this group’s starting figure. 
 In terms of outputs, it is clear from Table 4 that Group E is the only group to 
have experienced reductions for both outputs, namely 56% for WIES and 18.2% for 
inpatients treated.  Groups A and B experienced an increase for both outputs, and 
Groups C and D experienced a reduction in WIES and an increase in inpatients 
treated.  The totals for Table 4 indicate that overall, although the number of inpatients 
rose by over 26%, the inputs fell only marginally (5% and 0.6% respectively).  This 
indicates that overall, despite the amount10 of hospital closures and amalgamations, 
input savings were not realised in the same proportion.  Indeed, the WIES output 
figure rose by less than 5% over the period.  Table 5 shows the same inputs and 
outputs as ratios of the number of hospitals11 in each group for each year of 
observation. 
 Given that the number of Group A teaching hospitals did not alter over the 
period, the percentage changes for this group in Table 5 are identical to those in Table 
4.  Group B hospitals experienced one closure during the period, making the overall 
increase in WIES (6.6%) and Inpatients Treated (23.6%) even more prominent at 
11.66% and 29.5% respectively per hospital.  The quantity of the two inputs used fell 
for this group with the expected result that per hospital both inputs fell by a smaller 
percentage.  Group C hospitals also experienced one closure, and Group D hospitals 
experienced 2 closures.  For both these groups the WIES figure fell and the Inpatients 
rose over the period, with both inputs falling.  When viewed as ratios of hospital 
numbers, variables that increased are larger and those that fell are smaller because in 






                                                 
10 16 hospitals represent a13.67% reduction in the number of hospitals. 
11 (From Table 3) 
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Table 5:  Average Inputs and Outputs per Hospital 1992/93 – 1995/96 
Group Characteristic 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 % Change 
WIES 28764.13 28500.75 31552.81 31381.81 9.10 
Inpatients Treated 26915.94 28848.81 32631.19 34855.69 29.50 
EFT Staff (non-medical) 1474.63 1335.44 1373.44 1456.63 -1.22 
A 
Average Available Beds 387.94 393.06 400.00 415.75 7.17 
WIES 7889.45 7703.32 8478.33 8809.00 11.66 
Inpatients Treated 8357.27 8874.14 9911.14 10823.67 29.51 
EFT Staff (non-medical) 439.64 372.27 380.81 421.33 -4.16 
B 
Average Available Beds 140.18 131.45 130.10 136.19 -2.85 
WIES 1875.79 1697.96 1843.52 1833.35 -2.26 
Inpatients Treated 2056.71 2137.25 2358.00 2594.09 26.13 
EFT Staff (non-medical) 105.25 94.42 99.22 100.48 -4.53 
C 
Average Available Beds 40.58 36.63 39.43 38.39 -5.40 
WIES 1063.45 708.82 754.85 749.15 -29.56 
Inpatients Treated 793.50 860.91 912.95 980.15 23.52 
EFT Staff (non-medical) 49.14 43.77 44.80 45.85 -6.69 
D 
Average Available Beds 21.86 19.45 21.40 20.80 -4.86 
WIES 434.33 282.84 342.18 299.05 -31.15 
Inpatients Treated 276.61 294.29 374.64 355.71 28.60 
EFT Staff (non-medical) 33.00 30.29 33.45 33.95 2.89 
E 
Average Available Beds 10.55 11.65 12.36 10.24 -2.91 
WIES 6124.29 6005.20 7332.51 7430.97 21.34 
Inpatients Treated 5901.38 6401.47 7950.67 8630.94 46.25 
EFT Staff (non-medical) 324.46 293.26 332.22 357.38 10.14 
TOTAL 
Average Available Beds 94.82 94.34 105.28 109.17 15.13 
Source:  Victorian Hospitals’ Association, 1992/93 – 1995/96 
 The figures for small Group E hospitals show a somewhat different pattern.  
This group experienced 5 closures and 7 amalgamations over the period.  Although 
Table 4 results show reductions in both inputs and outputs, when taken as a ratio of 
the number of hospitals at the beginning and at the end of the period, the number of 
inpatients treated and the number of EFT staff both increased per hospital.  This 
indicates that, although the WIES figure shows a marked reduction (31.15%), these 
remaining small hospitals are actually treating significantly more patients and using 
marginally more staff (2.89%).  The large difference between inpatients treated and 
the WIES figure indicate that, either the weights or the WIES calculation as a whole, 
tends to discriminate against hospitals in groups D and E, and favour those in A, B 
and, to a lesser extent, C.  The total variation for WIES from highest (11.66%) to 
lowest (-31.15%) equals 42.8%.  Inpatients treated increase for all groups with only 
6% variation from highest (29.51%) to lowest (23.52).  In terms of the inputs used, 
despite no alteration to the number of hospitals, Group A beds increase by 7.2%, 
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whilst all other groups experience a reduction in average available beds per hospital.  
This is combined with a minor fall in EFT staff per hospital of 1.22% for Group A. 
 
9. Conclusion 
This paper has provided an examination of the health reform process, including the 
implementation of casemix funding in Victoria, within the context of the Australian 
healthcare system.  The pressures for reform of Victoria’s acute hospitals stemmed 
from excessive State debt as well as an identified need to improve hospital funding 
efficiency, together with the issue of conforming to the new competition policy 
legislation.  Given the obvious increase in the rate of growth of health expenditure in 
Victoria since 1995/96 (Graph 1) it is difficult to reconcile this with the initial 
objectives for adopting casemix funding.  In arriving at the conclusion that there does 
not appear to have been an improvement in individual hospitals’ technical efficiency 
over time, it is still evident that casemix funding has altered the way that scarce 
resources (that is, government funding) are distributed to acute hospitals.  
 Also, the existence of budget caps directly opposes the incentives in place for 
hospitals to meet waiting list targets.  This may blunt hospitals’ inclination to increase 
throughput indefinitely since a reduction in waiting lists would entail overrunning 
their annual budget.  As no budget overruns will be funded under the current system, 
it becomes necessary for hospitals to allow waiting lists to grow; another 
contradiction of the initial objectives for adopting casemix funding.  The growing 
number of Category Three patients provides evidence that this is occurring.  On the 
face of it, this combination of incentives appears to be directed at hospitals to better 
manage their limited resources.  However, the budget cap applies to a given number 
of WIES annually which have already been weighted for resource utilisation.  
Although casemix funding was originally designed, among other things, to improve 
efficiency in response to various reports on Victoria’s acute health system, the 
evidence produced here shows that this objective has not been realised.  If, in fact, 
overall cost savings were achieved in Victoria, they were due to closures and 
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